McGann (1997, 2002) provides a model of party factionalization in which the factions located near the mode will generally be larger in size.5 When the ideological distributions within each party are asymmetric, then the median and the mode do not coincide. Moreover, in the McGann model, the candidate of the faction located nearest the Democratic mode is apt to be to the left of the party's median, and the candidate of the faction located nearest the Republican mode is apt to be to the right of the party's median. Thus, if each faction within a party nominates a member of their own faction (say one at the faction median) in an MRSE election, then the candidate of the faction closest to the mode can be expected to do better, on average, than candidates of other factions, and (given skewed distributions) that candidate will be located away from the median in the direction of the party mode.6 In previous studies (McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman 2002a, b), we have offered simulation results in support of this proposition.
Past research investigating these centrist versus extremist predictions about U.S. congressional leaders have elicited mixed results. Sullivan (1975) , for example, found that congressional party leaders (1955-72) tended to be chosen from a wide ideological range, excluding, however, the most extreme. Likewise, Sinclair (1983) found that Democratic House leaders tended to be ideologically diverse. In the Senate (post-war period), Democrats tended to choose leaders from a center-left cluster that dominated the party for the 30-year period under analysis. Senate Republicans, on the other hand, did not recruit leaders from any particular ideological cluster. Patterson (1963) found that the ideology of party leaders did not tend to conform to either theory.
More recent research finds similarly mixed results. Polser and Rhodes (1997) examine the preselection behavior of House Speakers, majority and minority leaders, and majority and minority whips for the period 1875-1987. Employing a measure of party fidelity,7 Polser and Rhodes demonstrate that House Republicans tend to select leaders whose pre-election behavior signals their consistent location within the ideological core (median) of their party, thus providing strong support for the middleman hypothesis. Yet their analysis also shows that Democrats tend to select leaders whose pre-election behavior has signaled a willingness to increase the ideological differences between the two parties (Polser and Rhodes 1997). Clausen and Wilcox provide some empirical support for their theory of policy extremism (1987) for leaders of both parties.8 We will discuss their findings more fully in the following section. Second, our analysis is expanded over that of Clausen and Wilcox (1987) to reflect the dramatic change in party leadership structure that occurred after the 1970s. As a result of a "strategy of inclusion" (Sinclair 1995), the number of members who serve in leadership positions has dramatically increased since 1978.9 Clausen and Wilcox (1987) examined only floor leaders and whips (as did the 1997 Polser and Rhodes study), but our analysis includes other party leaders, such as deputy leaders, regional whips, and at-large whips.
Ideological Characteristics of Party Leaders and
Third, our analysis employs two measures of ideology, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores and American Conservative Union (ACU) scores, instead of the multidimensional, policy-specific approach used by Clausen and Wilcox (1987) . Because members cannot choose party leaders each time a new issue arises, we believe that, under the policy partisanship theory, party leaders should come from a concentrated faction whose ideological consanguinity reflects the major ideological differences between the parties.10 The vast majority of floor votes in the House fall along a single left-right Republican party leader is to the right of the median Republican leader. As a consequence, the modalparty leader in each party is more extreme than even the modal member of that party. From this figure, it is possible to ascertain once again that the modal party leader in each party is more extreme than the modal party member, who is more extreme than the median party leader, who is more extreme than the median party member. Table 1 Our hypothesis is that party leaders should be located in the part of the distribution away from the mean and beyond the median. In the case of Democrats, this hypothesis means that Democratic party leaders should be to the left of the median Democratic ADA score for any given year. The data in Table 1 Table 2 presents the same data for the Republicans (now using ACU scores) for the period 1971-96. In every year, the median ACU score for Republicans is to the right of the mean ACU score. We also expect that Republican party leaders should be ideologically to the right of the median Republican member. Once again, our expectations are generally confirmed. In 17 years, the median ACU score of Republican leaders is to the right of the median score for all Republicans, and in 3 years, it is identical to the median for all Republicans; in only 6 years are Republican leaders less far to the right than all Republicans. The same findings hold even more strongly for nonregional Republican party leaders. Their median ACU score is the same as, or to the right of, the median score for all Republicans in 22 of 26 years. Finally, examining only the median ACU score of the Republican floor leader and whip over a slightly longer time span, because our data allow us to go back further when we confine ourselves to the top two leaders (full data not reported), we discover that the median ACU score is to the right of the median ACU score of all Republicans in 28 of 30 years.
Visual examination of the data in these two tables supports the contention that House leaders tend to be located away from the mean and beyond the median ideological position of their respective parties, but are there statistically significant differences between the median ADA or ACU score of leaders and the median ADA or ACU score of all members? One way to test this proposition is to employ the MannWhitney test of the differences between these medians.19 If our hypothesis is correct, then there should be a significant difference between the median ADA or ACU scores of leaders and nonleaders, with the median ACU score of Republican leaders to the right of (i.e., greater than) the median of all Republicans and the median ADA score of Democratic leaders to the left of (i.e., greater than) the median of all Democrats.
Aggregating the data over the time period examined here confirms our expectations. The median ACU score of Republican leaders is 80 for all leaders and 83 for nonregional leaders, as compared to a median ACU score of 78 for all Republicans. Both differences are in the predicted direction. Both of these differences are significant at less than the .0001 level (z = -4.81 for all leaders and z = -6.15 for nonregional leaders). Similarly, not only is the median ADA score for all Democratic leaders (76) greater than the median for all Democrats (70), but this difference is statistically significant at less than .001 (z = -12.24). When we shift from ACU to ADA scores for Republicans as well, we find that the median ADA score of all Republican leaders (1965-96) is slightly over 9, in contrast to the median for all Republicans, which is greater than 11; this difference in medians is also significant at a probability level less than .0001 (z = 6.45).20 Thus, the difference between the median ideological positions of House leaders and other members is different than zero in the predicted direction and highly statistically significant, despite the fact that this variable is bounded and hence maximum feasible differences between leaders and nonleaders are constrained. Thus, although the median of the ideological distribution of a given party well approximates the ideological predispositions of that party's leaders, predicting a position slightly to the right of the overall party median yields an improved prediction for Republican leaders, and predicting a position slightly to the left of the overall party median yields an improved prediction for Democratic leaders.
In sum, we find strong evidence for our hypothesis: party leaders (in both parties) tend to be drawn from the part of the ideological spectrum where the greatest concentration of their members lies, the area beyond the median toward the party mode. The results stated above are based on a data distribution pooled over several decades. But, of course, the mean and variance of each party's ideological distribution (and the overlap between the two parties) has varied considerably over time (Grofman et al. forthcoming) . If we were to look at the present Congress, for example, we would find that the modal Democrat and the modal Republican are about as far apart as it is possible to get in terms of roll-call voting scores. Thus, when taken in conjunction with the recent dramatic polarization of the two parties in the House (with virtually no overlap in the two ideological distributions), our findings help explain the bitterly divided politics we are presently experiencing. If we take the leadership position to be the one (publicly) advocated by the congressional party, then the fact that leaders in each party are at their party's mode means that the Democrat and Republican are even further apart than they would be if we were simply contrasting the mean or median positions of the two parties. In contrast, in time periods when there has been greater overlap in party distributions, when party distributions have been bimodal rather than unimodal, or when both of these scenarios have held, we would not expect to find such extreme differences between the modes in each party.
This point helps explain how to reconcile the clarity of our empirical findings on extremism of House leaders with the mixed results in the previous literature. It seems there is one key reason for the differences. We are looking at data primarily from recent congresses. For congresses in the period we examine, the within-party ideological distributions tend to be unimodal-the Democrat's "right tail" of conservative southern Democrats has been dramatically diminished and the Republican "left tail" of liberals excised from the party altogether. Moreover, the distribution of ideology within parties is clearly skewed; the median Democratic ADA score is to the left of the mean Democratic ADA score and the median Republican ADA score is to the right of the mean Republican ADA score. For earlier periods, both parties were more bimodal in their distributions, and this fact will give rise to different results-a much more mixed picture, since there are competing "modes."
Our emphasis on the power of the modal voter in each party also has implications for recent debates about the nature of conditional party governance (Aldrich and Rohde 1998) and about the possibility of separating out ideology and party (see e.g., Krehbiel 2000) . How tight party discipline can be expected to be, and thus how easily we might be able to separate party and ideological influences on roll-call votes will, in our view, depend upon the mean and variance of the two party distributions and the nature of the overlap between them, as other authors have argued.
Thus, contra Krehbiel, we do not think that it is essentially impossible to separate out party and ideology, although we would agree that, atpresent, this is a very, very difficult task. Our work introduces new ideas into these debates with its emphasis that the degree of party unity will also depend upon how close the modal voter in each party is to the median voter in that party. When the modal and the median members of each party are close together, and when the medians of the parties are far apart, as they are at present, party members will have little incentive to break party discipline. If the party mode is far from the party median, however, then to the extent that the grouping around the mode defines the party's announced policy positions, many more members of the party will have reasons to be restless. 2. Relatedly, we might hypothesize that directly elected leaders will be more ideologically extreme than leaders chosen by seniority (i.e., committee chairs and ranking members).
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3. Banks (1999, 89) 9. This increase, however, has been largely among deputy and at-large leaders, with the role of regional whips declining precipitously. The Republicans have abandoned the regional whip designation as of the 104th Congress.
10. Clausen and Wilcox argue that a policy-specific approach is required because centrism may be acceptable in some domains but not in others (1987, 247), but they also assert that leaders are chosen from a set of members who share agreement on a set of issues.
11. We use ADA scores for the Democrats and ACU scores for the Republicans because ADA tends to pick votes that finely differentiate between shades of liberalism but do not discriminate well among Republicans (most of whom score very low). ACU, conversely, picks votes that discriminate well among conservatives but score most Democrats uniformly low. See Brunell et al. (1999) .
12. Because of the adjustment process, some adjusted scores may fall outside the 0-100 range.
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See Johnston and DiNardo 1997. 14. Regional party leaders are defined here as whips assigned to specific regions and elected by members from these regions. Separate data are included for these leaders because (1) the theory being examined here makes no claim about the ideology of these members (since they are elected only by a subset of all party members), and (2) previous research suggests that these types of leaders tend to conform ideologically to members from their own region (see Sinclair 1983 Sinclair , 1995 . A test of this proposition showed that it was indeed the case, especially for Democratic regional whips.
15. The 1969 case also conforms to the theory, although here the case is reversed. The Democratic mean is to the left of the median; therefore, the policy partisanship theory implies that leaders should be to the right of the Democratic median and mean.
16. Only 30 total years are examined in Table 1 because we were not able to  identify all party leaders in 1971 and 1972. 17. Year-by-year data for floor leaders and whips are not included in either Table 1 or Table 2 
